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Abstract
We address the diffusion of information about the COVID-19 with a
massive data analysis on Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit and Gab.
We analyze engagement and interest in the COVID-19 topic and provide
a differential assessment on the evolution of the discourse on a global scale
for each platform and their users. We fit information spreading with epi-
demic models characterizing the basic reproduction numbers R0 for each
social media platform. Moreover, we characterize information spreading
from questionable sources, finding different volumes of misinformation in
each platform. However, information from both reliable and questionable
sources do not present different spreading patterns. Finally, we provide
platform-dependent numerical estimates of rumors’ amplification.
Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) defined the SARS-CoV-2 virus (initially
known as 2019-nCoV) outbreak as a severe global threat 1. As foreseen already
in 2017 by the global risk report of the World Economic forum, global risks are
interconnected; in particular, the case of the COVID-19 epidemic (the infectious
disease caused by the most recently discovered human coronavirus) is showing
the critical role of information diffusion in a disintermediated news cycle [1].
∗corresponding author: w.quattrociocchi@unive.it
1WHO Link: Naming the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it.
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The term infodemic [2, 3] has been coined to outline the perils of misinfor-
mation phenomena during the management of virus outbreaks2 [4, 5], since it
could even speed up the epidemic process by influencing and fragmenting social
response [6]. As an example, CNN has recently anticipated a rumor about the
possible lock-down of Lombardy (a region in northern Italy) to prevent pan-
demics3, publishing the news hours before the official communication from the
Italian Prime Minister. As a result, people overcrowded trains and airports to
escape from Lombardy toward the southern regions before the lock-down was in
place, disrupting the government initiative aimed to contain the epidemics and
potentially increasing contagion. Thus, an important research challenge is to
determine how people seek or avoid information and how those decisions affect
their behavior [7], particularly when the news cycle – dominated by the disin-
termediated diffusion of information – alters the way information is consumed
and reported on. The case of the COVID-19 epidemic shows the critical impact
of this new information environment.
The information spreading can strongly influence people behavior and al-
ter the effectiveness of the countermeasures deployed by governments. To this
respect, models to forecast virus spreading are starting to account for the be-
havioral response of the population with respect to public health interventions
and the communication dynamics behind content consumption [8, 6, 9].
Social media platforms such as Youtube and Twitter provide direct access to
an unprecedented amount of content and may amplify rumors and questionable
information. Taking into account users’ preferences and attitudes, algorithms
mediate and facilitate content promotion and thus information spreading [10].
This shift of paradigm profoundly impacts the construction of social perceptions
[11] and the framing of narratives; it influences policy-making, political commu-
nication, as well as the evolution of public debate [12, 13] especially when issues
are controversial [14]. Indeed, users online tend to acquire information adhering
to their worldviews [15], to ignore dissenting information [16, 17] and to form
polarized groups around shared narratives [18, 19]. Furthermore, when polar-
ization is high, misinformation might easily proliferate [20, 21]. Some studies
pointed out that fake news and inaccurate information may spread faster and
wider than fact-based news [22]. However, this effect might be platform-specific.
The definition of “Fake News” may indeed be inadequate since political debate
often resorts to label opposite news as unreliable or fake [23].
In this work we provide an in-depth analysis of social dynamics in a time
window where narratives and moods in social media related to the COVID-
19 have emerged and spread. While most of the studies on misinformation
diffusion focus on a single platform [22, 24, 14], the dynamics behind information
consumption might be particular to the environment in which they spread on.
Consequently, in this paper we perform a comparative analysis on five social
media platforms (Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit and Gab) during the
2WHO Link: Director-Generals remarks at the media briefing on 2019 novel coronavirus
on 8 February 2020
3CNN Link: Italy prohibits travel and cancels all public events in its northern region to
contain coronavirus
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COVID-19 outbreak. The dataset includes more than 8 million comments and
posts over a time span of 45 days. We analyze user engagement and interest
about the COVID-19 topic, providing an assessment of the discourse evolution
over time on a global scale for each platform. Furthermore, we model the spread
of information with epidemic models, characterizing for each platform its basic
reproduction numbers (R0), i.e. the average number of secondary cases (users
that start posting about COVID-19) an “infectious” individual (an individual
already posting on COVID-19) will create. In epidemiology, R0 is a threshold
parameter, where for R0 < 1 the disease will die out in a finite period of time,
while the disease will spread for R0 > 1. In social media, R0 > 1 will indicate
the possibility of an infodemic.
Finally, coherently with the classification provided by the fact-checking or-
ganization Media Bias/Fact Check4, we characterize the spreading of news re-
garding COVID-19 from questionable sources for all channels but Instagram,
finding that mainstream platforms are less susceptible to misinformation dif-
fusion. However, information marked either as reliable or questionable do not
present significant differences in the way they spread.
Our findings suggest that the interaction patterns of each social media plat-
form combined with the peculiarity of the audience of the specific platform play
a pivotal role in information and misinformation spreading. We conclude the
paper by measuring rumors amplification parameters for COVID-19 on each
social media platform.
1 Results and Discussion
We analyze mainstream platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and YouTube as
well as less regulated social media platforms such as Reddit and Gab. Gab is a
crowdfunded social media whose structure and features are Twitter-inspired. It
performs very little control on content posted; in the political spectrum, its user
base is considered to be far-right. Reddit is an American social news aggrega-
tion, web content rating, and discussion website based on collective filtering of
information.
We perform a comparative analysis of information spreading dynamics around
the same argument in different environments having different interaction set-
tings and audiences. We collect all pieces of content related to COVID-19 from
the 1st of January to the 14th of February. Data have been collected filtering
contents accordingly to a selected sample of Google Trends’ COVID-19 related
queries such as: coronavirus, coronavirusoutbreak, imnotavirus, ncov, ncov -19,
pandemic, wuhan. The deriving dataset is then composed of 1,342,103 posts and
7,465,721 comments produced by 3,734,815 users. For more details regarding
the data collection refer to SI.
4https://mediabiasfactcheck.com classifies news sources that are considered reliable and
news sources that are considered unreliable
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1.1 Interaction patterns
First, we analyze the interactions (i.e., the engagement) that users have with
COVID-19 topics on each platform. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows users’
engagement around the COVID-19. Despite the differences among the single
platforms, we observe that they all display a rather similar distribution of the
users’ activity characterized by a long tail. This entails that users behave sim-
ilarly for what concern the dynamics of reactions and content consumption.
Indeed, users’ interactions with the COVID-19 content present attention pat-
terns similar to any other topic [25]. The highest volume of interactions in terms
of posting and commenting can be observed on mainstream platforms such as
YouTube and Twitter. Then, to provide an overview of the debate concerning
the virus outbreak, we extract and analyze all topics related to the COVID-19
content by means of Natural Language Processing techniques. We build word
embedding for the text corpus of each platform, i.e. a word vector represen-
tation in which words sharing common lexical contexts are in close proximity.
Moreover, by running clustering procedures on these vector representations, we
separate groups of words and topics that are perceived as more relevant for the
COVID-19 debate. For further details see SI. The results (Figure 1, middle
panel) show that topics are quite similar across each social media platform. De-
bates range from comparisons to other viruses, requests for God blessing, up
to racism, while the largest volume of interaction is related to the lock-down of
flights.
Finally, to characterize users engagement with the COVID-19 on the five
platforms, we compute the cumulative number of new posts each day (Figure 1,
middle panel). For all platforms, we find a change of behavior around the 20th
of January, that is the day that the World Health Organization (WHO) issued
its first situation report on the COVID-195. The largest increase in the number
of posts is the on the 21st of January for Gab, the 24th January for Reddit, the
30th January for Twitter, the 31th January for YouTube and the 5th of February
for Instagram. Thus, social media platforms seem to have specific timings for
content consumption; such patterns may depend upon the difference in terms
of audience and interaction mechanisms (both social and algorithmic) among
platforms.
5WHO Link: Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) SITUATION REPORT - 1
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Figure 1: Upper panel: activity (likes, comments, reposts, etc..) distribution
for each social media. Middle panel: most discussed topics about COVID-19 on
each social media. Lower panel: cumulative number of contents produced from
the 1st of January to the 14th of February. Due to limitations in gathering past
data using the standard API, the first data point for Twitter is dated January
27th.
1.2 Information Spreading
Efforts to simulate the spreading of information on social media by reproducing
real data have mostly applied variants of standard epidemic models [26, 27, 28,
29]. Coherently, we analyze the observed monotonic increasing trend in the
way new users interact with information related to the COVID-19 by means of
epidemic models. Unlike previous works, we do not only focus on models that
imply specific growth mechanisms, but also on phenomenological models that
emphasize the reproducibility of empirical data [30].
Most of the epidemiological models focus on the basic reproduction number
R0, representing the expected number of infections directly generated by an
infected individual for a given time period [31]. An epidemic is considered to be
dangerous if R0 > 1, – i.e., if an exponential growth in the number of infections
is expected at least in the initial phase. In our case, we try to model the growth
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in number of people publishing a post on a subject as an infective process,
where people can start publishing after being exposed to the topic. While in real
epidemics R0 > 1 highlights the possibility of a pandemic, in our approach R0 >
1 indicates the possibility of an infodemic. We model the dynamics both with
the phenomenological model of [32] (from now on referred to as the EXP model)
and with the standard SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) compartmental
model [33]. Further details on the modeling approach can be found in Section
3.3.
As shown in Figure 2, each platform has its own basic reproduction num-
ber R0. As expected, all the values of R0 are supercritical - even considering
confidence intervals (table 1) - signaling the possibility of an infodemic. This
observation may facilitate the prediction task of information spreading during
critical events.
While R0 is a good proxy for the engagement rate and a good predictor for
epidemic-like information spreading, social contagion phenomena might be in
general more complex [34, 35, 36]. For instance, in the case of Instagram, we
observe an abrupt jump in the number of new users that cannot be explained
with continuous models like the standard epidemic ones; accordingly, the SIR
model estimates a value of R0 ∼ 102 that is way beyond what has been observed
in any real-world epidemic.
Figure 2: Growth of the number of authors vs time. Time is expressed in
number of days since 1st Jan 2020 (day 1). Shaded areas represents [5%, 95%]
estimates of the models obtained via bootstrapping least square estimates of
the EXP model (upper panels, eq. 3) and of the SIR model (lower panels, eq.
3.3).
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Gab Reddit YouTube Instagram Twitter
REXP0 [1.42, 1.52] [1.44, 1.51] [1.56, 1.70] [2.02, 2.64] [1.65, 2.06]
RSIR0 [2.2, 2.5] [2.4, 2.8] [3.2, 3.5] [1.1x10
2, 1.6x102] [4.0, 5.1]
Table 1: [5%, 95%] interval of confidence R0 as estimated from bootstrapping
the least square fits parameter of the EXP and of the SIR model. Notice that,
due to the steepness of the growth of the number of new authors in Instagram,
R0 assumes unrealistic values ∼ 102 for the SIR model.
1.3 Questionable VS Accurate Information
We conclude our analysis by comparing the diffusion of questionable and reliable
news on each platform. We tag links as reliable or questionable according to the
data reported by the independent fact-checking organization Media Bias/Fact
Check6.
Figure 3 shows, for each platform, the plots of the cumulative number of
posts and reactions related to questionable sources versus the cumulative num-
ber of posts and interactions referring to reliable sources. By interactions we
mean the overall reactions, e.g. likes or other form or endorsement and com-
ments, that can be performed with respect to a post on a social platform.
Surprisingly, all the posts show a strong linear correlation, i.e., the number of
posts/reactions relying on questionable and reliable sources grows with the same
pace inside the same social media platform. We observe the same phenomenon
also for the engagement with reliable and unreliable posts. Hence, the growth
dynamics of unreliable posts/interactions is just a re-scaled version of the growth
dynamics of reliable posts/reactions; however, the re-scaling factor ρ (i.e., the
fraction of unreliable over reliable) is strongly dependent on the platform. In
particular, we observe that in mainstream social media the number of unreliable
posts represent a small fraction of the reliable ones; the same thing happens in
Reddit. Among less regulated social media, a peculiar effect is observed in Gab:
while the volume of unreliable post is just the ∼ 70% of the volume of reliable
ones, the volume of reactions for unreliable posts is ∼ 270% bigger than the vol-
ume for reliable ones. Such results hint the possibility that different platform
react differently to reliable and unreliable news.
To further investigate this issue, we define the amplification factor E as the
average number of reactions to a post; hence, E is a measure that quantifies the
extent to which a post is amplified in a social media. We observe that the am-
plification EU (for unreliable posts) and ER (for reliable posts) varies from social
media to social media and that assumes the largest values in YouTube and the
lowest in Gab. To measure the permeability of a platform to reliable/unreliable
news, we then define the coefficient of relative amplification α = EU/ER. It is
a measure of whether a social media amplifies questionable (α > 1) or reliable
(α < 1) posts. Results are shown in Table 2. Among mainstream social media,
we notice that Twitter is the most neutral (α ∼ 100% i.e. EU ∼ ER), while
6https://mediabiasfactcheck.com
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YouTube cuts out unreliable sources (α ∼ 10%). Among less popular social
media, Reddit reduces the impact of unreliable sources (α ∼ 50%), while Gab
strongly amplifies them (α ∼ 400%).
Overall, our findings suggest that the main drivers of information spreading
are related to specific peculiarities of each platform and depends upon the group
dynamics of individuals engaged with the topic.
Figure 3: Upper panels: plot of the cumulative number of posts referring to
questionable sources versus the cumulative number of posts referring to reliable
sources. Lower panel: plot of the cumulative number of engagements relatives
to questionable sources versus the cumulative number of engagements relative
to reliable sources. Notice that a linear behavior indicates that the time evo-
lution of questionable posts/engagements is just a re-scaled version of the time
evolution of reliable posts/engagements. Each plot indicates the regression coef-
ficients ρ, representing the ratio among the volumes of questionable and reliable
posts (ρpost) and engagements (ρeng). In more popular social media, the num-
ber of unreliable posts represent a small fraction of the reliable ones; same
thing happens in Reddit. Among less popular social media, a peculiar effect
is observed in Gab: while the volume of unreliable post is just the ∼ 70% of
the volume of reliable ones, the volume of engagements for unreliable posts is
∼ 270% bigger than the volume for reliable ones. Further details concerning the
regression coefficients are reported in SI.
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EU ER α
Gab 5.6 1.4 3.9
Reddit 22.7 40.1 0.55
YouTube 1.4×104 3.9×104 0.35
Twitter 15.1 15.6 0.97
Table 2: The average engagement of a post is the number reaction expected for
a post and is a measure of how much a post is amplified in a social media. The
average engagements EU (for unreliable post) and ER (for reliable post) vary
from social media to social media, and are the largest in Twitter and the lowest
in Gab. The coefficient of relative amplification α = EU/ER measures whether a
social media amplifies more unreliable (α > 1) or reliable (α < 1) posts. Among
more popular social media, we notice that Twitter is the most neutral social
media (α ∼ 100% i.e. EU ∼ ER) while YouTube cuts out unreliable sources
(α ∼ 10%). Among less popular social media, Reddit reduces the impact of
unreliable sources (α ∼ 50%) while Gab strongly amplifies them (α ∼ 400%).
2 Conclusions
In this work we perform a comparative analysis on five different social media
platforms during the COVID-19 health emergency. Such a timeframe is good
benchmark for studying content consumption dynamics around critical events
in a historic times when the accuracy of information is threatened. We assess
users engagement and interest about the COVID-19 topic and characterize the
evolution of the discourse over time. Furthermore, we model the spread of in-
formation with epidemic models by providing basic growth parameters for each
social media. We then analyze the spreading of questionable information for all
channels, finding that Gab is the environment more susceptible to misinforma-
tion diffusion. However, information marked either as reliable or questionable
do not present significant differences in their spreading patterns. Our analysis
suggests that information spreading is driven by the interaction paradigm im-
posed by the specific social media or/and by the specific interaction patterns of
groups of users engaged with the topic. Finally, we conclude the paper by pro-
viding COVID-19 rumors amplification parameters for social media platform.
We believe that the understanding of social dynamics behind content consump-
tion and social media is an important subject, since it may help to design more
efficient epidemic models accounting for social behavior and to implement more
efficient communication strategies in time of crisis.
3 Materials and Methods
3.1 Data Collection
Table 3 reports the data breakdown of the five social platforms. Given the
diversity of social media platforms, five different data collection processes have
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been performed. For Gab, Reddit, YouTube and Twitter data were gathered
by the existing API services, while for Instagram no API services were available
thus we built our own process. In particular, we manually collected data by
visual inspection to build up the database for the analysis.
Reddit dataset was downloaded from the Pushift.io7 archive, exploiting the
related API. In order to filter contents linketo COVID-19, we selected a group
of keywords based on Google Trends’ COVID-19 related queries such as: coron-
avirus, pandemic, coronaoutbreak, china, wuhan, nCoV, IamNotAVirus, coron-
avirus update, coronavirus transmission, coronavirusnews, coronavirusoutbreak.
In Gab, although no official guides are available, there is an API service that
given a certain keyword, returns a list of users, hashtags and groups related to
it. We queried all the keywords we selected based on Google Trends and we
downloaded all hashtags linked to them. We then manually browsed the results
and selected a set of hashtags based on their meaning. For each hashtag in our
list, we downloaded all the posts and comments linked to it.
For YouTube, we collected videos by using the YouTube Data API8 by
searching for videos that matched a variety of queries: coronavirus OR coro-
navirus weapon OR coronavirus epidemic OR coronavirus outbreak OR coro-
navirus pandemic OR coronavirus conspiracy OR coronavirus news OR nCov-
2019 OR #coronavirus OR nCov OR corona virus OR corona-virus OR novel-
coronavirus OR wuhanvirus OR novel coronavirus OR wuhan virus OR coron-
avirus bio-weapon OR corvid-19 OR COVID-19. Then an in depth search was
done by crawling the network of videos by searching for more related videos as
established by the YouTube algorithm. From the gathered set, we filtered the
videos that contained coronavirus OR nCov OR corona virus OR corona-virus
OR corvid OR covid OR SARS-CoV in the title or description. We also limited
the dataset to the videos published during the analysis period (January 1 to
February 14). We then collected all the comments received by those videos.
This was done on February 28. For Twitter, we collect tweets related to the
topic corona-virus by using both Twitter the search and stream endpoint of the
Twitter API9 using the following queries: coronavirus OR ncov OR coronaviru-
soutbreak OR wuhan OR iamnotavirus. The data deriving from stream API
represent only 1% of the total volume of tweets, further filtered by the selected
keywords.The data derived from the search API represent a random sample of
the tweets containing the selected keywords up to a maximum rate limit of 18000
tweets every 10 minutes. Since no official API are available for Instagram data,
we built our own process to collect public contents related to specific keywords
such as: coronavirus, nCov, wuhan, pandemic and imnotavirus. We manually
took notes of posts, comments and populated the Instagram Dataset.
The results related to the engagement of users are obtained using only API
search results.
7https://pushshift.io/
8Link: YouTube Data API
9Link: Twitter API
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Posts Comments Users Period
Gab 6,252 4,364 2,629 01/01-14/02
Reddit 10,084 300,751 89,456 01/01-14/02
YouTube 111,709 7,051,595 3,199,525 01/01-14/02
Instagram 26,576 109,011 52,339 01/01-14/02
Twitter 1,187,482 - 390,866 27/01-14/02
Total 1,342,103 7,465,721 3,734,815
Table 3: Data breakdown of the number of posts, comments and users for all
platforms.
3.2 Text analysis
To provide an overview of the debate concerning the virus outbreak on the var-
ious platforms, we extract and analyze all topics related to COVID-19 by ap-
plying Natural Language Processing techniques to the written content of each
social media. We first build word embedding for the text corpus of each plat-
form, then, to assess the topics around which the perception of the COVID-19
debate is concentrated, we cluster words by running the Partitioning Around
Medoids (PAM) algorithm on their vector representations.
Word embeddings, i.e., distributed representations of words learned by neu-
ral networks, represent words as vectors in Rn bringing similar words closer
to each other. They perform significantly better than the well-known Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA) and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for preserving
linear regularities among words and computational efficiency on large data sets
[37]. In this paper we use the Skip-gram model [38] to construct word embed-
ding of each social media corpus. More formally, given a content represented
by the sequence of words w1, w2, . . . , wT , we use stochastic gradient descent
with gradient computed through backpropagation rule [39] for maximizing the
average log probability
1
T
T∑
t=1
 k∑
j=−k
log p(wt+j |wt)
 (1)
where k is the size of the training window. Therefore, during training the vector
representations of closely related words are pushed to be close to each other.
In the Skip-gram model, every word w is associated with its input and output
vectors, uw and vw, respectively. The probability of correctly predicting the
word wi given the word wj is defined as
p(wi|wj) =
exp
(
uTwivwj
)
V∑
l=1
exp
(
uTl vwj
) (2)
where V is the number of words in the corpus vocabulary. Two major parame-
ters affect the training quality: the dimensionality of word vectors, and the size
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of the surrounding words window. We choose 200 as vector dimension – that is
typical value for training large dataset – and 6 words for the window.
Before applying the tool, we reduced to contents written in English language
as detected with cld310. Then we cleaned the corpora by removing HTML
code, URLs and email addresses, user mentions, hashtags, stop-words, and all
the special characters including digits. Finally, we dropped words composed by
less than three characters, words occurring less than five times in all the corpus,
and contents with less than three words.
To analyze the topics related to COVID-19, we cluster words by Partition-
ing Around Medoids (PAM) and using as proximity metric the cosine distance
matrix of words in their vector representations. In order to select the num-
ber of clusters, k, we calculate the average silhouette width for each value of
k. Moreover, for evaluating the cluster stability, we calculate the average pair-
wise Jaccard similarity between clusters based on 90% sub-samples of the data.
Lastly, we produce word clouds to identify the topic of each cluster. To provide
a view about the debate around the virus outbreak, we define the distribution
over topics Θc for a given content c as the distribution of its words among the
word clusters. Thus, to quantify the relevance of each topic within a corpus, we
restrict to contents c with max Θc > 0.5 and consider them uniquely identified
as a single topic each.
Cleaned contents Vocabulary size Topics Contents with max Θ > 0.5
Instagram 21,189 posts 15,324 17 4,467
Twitter 638,214 posts 22,587 21 369,131
Gab 5,853 posts 3,024 19 2,986
Reddit 10,084 posts 1,968 34 6,686
YouTube 815,563 comments 35,381 30 679,261
Table 4: Results of text cleaning and analysis for all the corpora.
3.3 Epidemiological Models
To allow predictions, assess the impact of policies, and thus to define optimal
control/communication strategies, it is important to model the dynamics ob-
served from data. Several mathematical models can be used to analyse potential
mechanisms that underline epidemiological data; generally, we can distinguish
among phenomenological models that emphasize the reproducibility of empir-
ical data without insights in the mechanisms of growth, and more insightful
mechanistic models that try to incorporate such mechanisms [30].
To fit our cumulative curves, we first use the adjusted exponential model
of [32] since it naturally provides an estimate of the basic reproduction num-
ber R0. This phenomenological model (from now on indicated as EXP) has
been successfully employed in data-scarce settings and shown to be on-par with
10 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/cld3/index.html
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more traditional compartmental models for multiple emerging diseases like Zika,
Ebola, and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome [32].
The model is defined by the following single equation:
I =
[
R0
(1 + d)t
]t
(3)
Here, I is incidence, t is the number of days, R0 is the basic reproduction number
and d is a damping factor accounting for the reduction in transmissibility over
time.In our case, we interpret I as the number Cauth of authors that have
published a post on the subject.
As a mechanistic model, we employ the classical SIR model [33]. In such a
model, a susceptible population can be infected with a rate β by coming into
contact with infected individuals; however, infected individuals can recover with
a rate γ. The model is described by a set of differential equations:
∂tS = −βS · I/N
∂tI = βS · I/N − γI (4)
∂tR = γI
where S is the number of susceptible, I is the number of infected and R is the
number of recovered. In our case, we interpret the number I+R as the number
Cauth of authors that have published a post on the subject.
In the SIR model, the basic reproduction number R0 = β/γ corresponds to
the ration among the rate of infection by contact β and the rate of recovery
γ. Notice that for the SIR model, vaccination strategies correspond to bringing
the system in a situation where S < N/R0; in such a way, both the number of
infected will decrease.
To estimate the basic reproduction numbers REXP0 and R
SIR
0 for the EXP
and the SIR model, we use least square estimates of the models’ parameters[31].
The range of parameters is estimated via bootstrapping [40, 30].
3.4 Regression Table of Figure 3
Table 5 reports the regression coefficients and R2 values displayed in Figure 3.
We observe an overall high value of R2 meaning a strong explanatory power of
the performed linear regressions.
3.5 Matching ability
We consider all the posts in our dataset that contain at least one Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) linking to a website outside the related social me-
dia (e.g., tweets pointing outside Twitter). We separate URLs in two main
categories obtained using the classification provided by MediaBias/FactCheck
(MBFC). MBFC provides a classification determined by ranking bias in four dif-
ferent categories that are Biased Wording/Headlines, Factual/Sourcing, Story
Choices and Political Affiliation. A score is assigned to each category per each
13
Name Intercept Coefficient (ρ) R2
Regression 1 Gab users -6.163 0.80 0.992
Regression 2 Reddit users -6.439 0.085 0.995
Regression 3 YouTube users 0.890 0.149 0.999
Regression 4 Twitter users -118.157 0.121 0.991
Regression 5 Gab posts -22.321 0.695 0.996
Regression 6 Reddit posts -4.111 0.047 0.997
Regression 7 YouTube posts 4.529 0.073 0.998
Regression 8 Twitter posts -151.44 0.110 0.998
Regression 9 Gab interactions 74.577 2.721 0.981
Regression 10 Reddit interactions -70.677 0.026 0.990
Regression 11 YouTube interactions -8854.33 0.025 0.986
Regression 12 Twitter interactions -2136.978 0.107 0.987
Table 5: Coefficients and R2 of the linear regressions displayed in Figure 3.
news outlet and the average score determined the bias of the outlet, as explained
in the Methodology Section of the website.
Accordingly, to each news outlet is associated a label that refers either to
a political bias, namely, Right, Right-Center, Least-Biased, Left-Center and
Left or to its reliability that is expressed in three labels namely, Conspiracy-
Pseudoscience, Pro-Science or Questionable. Noticeably, also the Questionable
set include a wide range of political bias, from Extreme Left to Extreme Right.
For instance, the Right label is associated to Fox News, the Questionable label
to Breitbart (the well-known extreme right outlet) and the Pro-Science label
to Science. Using such a classification, we assign to each of these outlets a
binary label that partially stems from the labelling provided by MBFC. In-
deed, we divide the news outlets into Questionable outlets and Reliable outlets.
All the outlets already classified as Questionable or belonging to the category
Conspiracy-Pseudoscience are labelled as Questionable, the rest is labelled as
Reliable.
Considering all the 2637 news outlets that we retrieve from the list provided
by MBFC we end up with 800 outlets classified as Questionable 1837 outlets
classified as Reliable.
Using such a classification we quantify our overall ability to match and labels
domains of posts containing URLs (that are expanded in case they come in their
shortened form). Our matching ability is reported in Table 6.
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Gab Reddit YouTube Instagram Twitter
Posts containing a URL 3778 10084 351786 1328 356448
Matched 0.47 0.55 0.035 0.09 0.27
Questionable 0.38 0.045 0.064 0.05 0.10
Reliable 0.62 0.955 0.936 0.95 0.90
Table 6: Number of posts containing a URL, matching ability and classification
for each of the five platforms.
The matching ability that, in some cases like YouTube is pretty low, doesn’t
refer to the ability of identifying known domain but to the ability of finding the
news outlets that belong to the list provided by MBFC. Indeed in all the social
networks we find a strong tendency towards linking to other social media post
that we are unable to match. The percentage of inter and intra-linking of social
media is reported in Table 7.
Gab Reddit YouTube Instagram Twitter Facebook
Gab 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.138 ∼0
Reddit 0.043 0.006 0.009 0.001 ∼0 0
YouTube 0 ∼0 0.292 ∼0 0.088 0.081
Instagram 0 0 0.003 0 0.001 0.001
Twitter 0.059 0.001 0.257 0.003 ∼0 ∼0
Table 7: Fraction of URLs pointing to social media.
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